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(1) go into the practice of patent law or patent soliciting in Ohio and
,Michigan within a~period of five years, or (2) deal with any clients that
employer .had while the employee worked for the employer, was held valid
and enforceable as to the first- part; but was held -to be ambiguous, unreasonable, illegal and.in restraint of trade as to the second part.
ROBERT C. BENSING

CORPORATIONS
During the past year there were an unusual number of important cases
in this area. The most significant development, of course, was the enactment of the new General Corporation Law1 effective October 11, 1955. So
far, all of the cases have been decided under the old statute.
Subscriptions for Shares
In Frougv. Miamt Sawngs and Loan Co.2 the court held that the plaintiff was a depositor in the defendant savings company rather than a subscriber for shares. The case is interesting only because of the broad statement by the court that a subscription for shares must be in writing. As
applied to the particular case, the statement is correct, since the building
and loan association statute does indicate that subscriptions must be written.3 However, the statement of the court should not be viewed as a binding precedent establishing a general rule of corporation law. The new
General Corporation Law is silent on this problem and the weight of
authority elsewhere is that subscriptions need not be written. However,
both in Ohio and in other jurisdictions, it is held that a contract for the
purchase of shares, as opposed to a share subscription, is within the statute
of frauds of the Uniform Sales Act.4
Tort Liability of Corporate Director
An interesting and novel situation -was presented in Young vo. Featherstone Motors.5 The plaintiff's airplane was damaged by a collision with
a motorcycle owned by the defendant corporation and driven by the ser1

O0iO REV. CODE c. 1701.

'128 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio App. 1953).
8
OHio REV. CoDE§ 1151.20.
'On the distinction between a subscription and a contract of purchase, and the statute of frauds problem relative to both, see 1 DAVIES OHio CORP. LAW 264, 269,
and 510 (1942).
'97 Ohio App. 158, 124 NXE.2d 158 (1954).
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vant of the corporation. The corporation was held liable, not under respondeat superior, but for negligence in failing to furnish the driver with
a safe motorcycle. 6 In this case the plaintiff was an officer and director
of the defendant corporation, and the argument was made that in such
capacity the plaintiff was ultimately responsible for the negligence of the
corporation, so its negligence should be imputed to him and bar recovery.
The court recognized that the case was one of first impression in Ohio, and
followed -the dear weight of authority in allowing recovery. The negligence would have been imputed to the plaintiff director if he had been
specifically responsible for the negligent act.

Problems of Corporate Control
An issue of first impression in Ohio was presented by Mills v. Mills.7
Plaintiff and defendant formed a partnership for the purpose of carrying
on a business in corporate form. The court of appeals properly denied an
injunction against breach of the partnership agreement. Where the parties
use the corporate form to achieve limited liability their rights as to control
of the business are governed exclusively by principles of corporation law.
The case is in accord with the cases from other states.
The law never contemplated that persons engaged in business as partners may incorporate, with intent to obtain the advantages and immunities
of a corporate form, and then Proteus-like, become at will a copartnership or a corporation, as the exigencies or purposes of their joint enterprise
may from time to time require.*
Barsan v. PioneerSavings and Loan is not only a case of first impression in Ohio, but a new case in the United States. A corporation issued a
new block of shares without granting the old shareholders their statutory
pre-emptive rights. Apparently the failure to grant -the right was an innocent mistake of law on the part of all concerned. When the directors
discovered their error, they cancelled the new issue and offered to refund
the purchase price to the new shareholders. On suit of a new shareholder,
the court of appeals enjoined the cancellation, on the ground that the old
shareholders, and not the corporation, were the only ones harmed by the
violation of the pre-emptive rights statute and were the only ones who
could object.10 The court of appeals decision was discussed in last year's
'Other aspects of this case are commented on in the AGENCY and CIVL PROCEDURE
sections in this survey supra.
'127 N.E.2d 222 (Ohio App. 1952).
'Boag v. Thompson, 208 App. Div. 132, 136, 203 N.Y. Supp. 395, 398 (2d Dep't.
1924).
'163 Ohio St. 424, 127 N.E.2d 614 (1955).
10121 N.E.2d 76 (Ohio App. 1954).

19561

SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -1955

survey"1 and was predicated on the assumption that all of the old shareholders not only failed to ask for pre-emptive rights, but specifically waived
them by voting in favor of the new issue. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, finding from the record that there were old shareholders who had
not voted for the new issue. The Supreme Court expressly approved the
court of appeals theory, i.e., that the corporation has no legal or equitable
privilege to enforce the shareholder's rights. However, the result reached
by the court seems contrary to the theory. The Supreme Court sent the
case back to the trial court with instructions to enjoin cancellation and
also to compel the corporation to grant pre-emptive rights to the old shareholders on terms fixed by the trial court. Significantly, this relief is granted
the old shareholders, even though none of them have claimed their rights.
The effect is to leave the new shares outstanding, but subject to an option
in the old shareholders, the terms and duration of the option to be determined by the trial court. Thus the court held that where none of the
shareholders objects to a denial of pre-emptive rights, the corporation cannot unilaterally enforce the right after sale of the issue, but an equity court
can and will do so.
Under cumulative voting, the smaller the number of directors who are
up for election, the greater is the proportion of shares needed by the
minority group to place a director on the board. Thus the effectiveness of
cumulative voting as a protection for the minority can be severely limited
by a system of classifying directors so that only one class is elected each
year.' 2 About half of the states, including Ohio, have provided for both
staggered elections and mandatory cumulative voting. In spite of the inherent conflict between these provisions, there have been no cases on the
subject until this year. A number of suits are now pending throughout
the country attacking the classified boards. The catalyst for this rash of
litigation was the Montgomery Ward proxy fight last spring. In lVolfson
v. Avery' 8 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the constitutional provision
for cumulative voting overruled the statute authorizing classified boards,
on the ground that the cumulative voting provision should be interpreted
so that a shareholder can cumulate his vote with maximum effectiveness.
The situation in Ohio is somewhat different, as the cumulative voting provision is in a statute rather than in the constitution. However, shortly
- 6 WnsT. Ras. L. REv. 236 (1955).
"As a policy matter, staggered elections do tend to preserve stability and continuity
of management. However, the evil of staggered elections is not only that they restrict minority representation rights, but also that they may tend towards perpetuation of mismanagement. Thus in the absence of a provision for removal of directors without cause, a slight majority would have to wage two or even three successive
proxy battles to elect a majority of directors to a staggered board.
" 6 I11.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

Uune

after the Illinois decision, an Ohio court of appeals applied the same basic
theory. The court held that since the Ohio cumulative voting statute is both
older and more specific than the classification statute, the former reflects
the paramount public policy and controls in case of a conflict.'4
Shareholders Derivative Actions
The important question of whether or not a majority of shareholders
can ratify the fraud of a director was answered in the affirmative by the
Supreme Court in Claman v. Robertson.15 A shareholder brought a derivative action against certain directors alleging fraud on the corporation
and a corrupt refusal by the corporation to enforce its rights against the
guilty directors. The normal rule is that the plaintiff in such an action
must allege that he has first exhausted his remedies within the corporation, or show a valid excuse. The plaintiff was excused from asking the
directors to sue because the directors alleged to be guilty of fraud were still
in control of the corporation. However, the shareholders had ratified the
fraud, and no attempt was made by the plaintiff to ask the shareholders
to rescind their approval. In a number of cases in other states the courts
have held that where fraud is involved the plaintiff does not have to appeal
to the shareholders because such an appeal would be a useless act, as a
majority have no power to ratify a fraud.16 In an ably written opinion the
Supreme Court rejects this view and holds that a majority of shareholders
can bind the minority by a ratification. This rule has the advantage of
discouraging "strike" suits or nuisance litigation. However, as pointed
out by Judge Zimmerman in his dissent, the rule adopted by the majority
of the court tends to encourage fraud, especially in a large corporation like
the defendant which has many shareholders, most of whom vote by proxies
solicited by the management.
The Claman case was decided under the old corporation statute which
was silent on the issue. The new code, enacted, but not effective, at the
" Humphrys v. Winous Company, 125 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio App. 1955), appeal as a
mater of right denied, appeal granted and now pending, 164 Ohio St. 254, 129

N.E.2d 822 (1955). The classification system in the Ohio case was a much more
flagrant violation of the cumulative voting statute than that which was upset by the
Illinois Court. In the Illinois case three directors out of nine were elected annually
while in the Ohio case only one out of a three man board was elected each year.
Note: After this article went to press, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed by the Supreme Court. 165 Ohio St. 45 (1956). The decision was 4 to 2
and will be commented on in next year's Survey.
" 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955).
"8This is the so-called "New York rule." Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206
N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).

